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Muchin: The Starker Cases: Deferment Opportunities under I.R.C. Section 1

THE STARKER CASES: DEFERMENT
OPPORTUNITIES UNDER I.R.C.
SECTION 1031
I.

AN INTRODUCTION TO NONRECOGNITION TREATMENT UNDER

I.R.C. SECTION 1031
Internal Revenue Code section 10311 was enacted as a mandatory
exception2 to I.R.C. section 1001(c), 3 and was intended to defer recognition of gain or loss on an exchange of like-kind property.' Ordinarily
the fair market value of property received in a bargained-for exchange
1. I.R.C. § 1031 states the requisites necessary to qualify as a nontaxable exchange. The
exchange must result from a transfer of business or investment property exchanged solely or primarily for property of a like-kind. All section references are to the Int. Rev. Code of 1954, Ch.
736, 68A Stat. 302 as amended by Act of Dec. 30, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 212(c)(1), 83 Stat.
571, and the regulations promulgated thereunder, unless otherwise indicated.
Since I.R.C. § 1031 is the subject of this note's analysis all relevant sections appear below.
§ 1031. Exchange of Property Heldfor Productive Use or Investment
(a) Nonrecognition ofgain or lossfrom exchanges solely in kind.-No gain or loss
shall be recognized if property held for productive use in trade or business or for investment (not including stock in trade or other property held primarily for sale, nor stocks,
bonds, notes, choses in action, certificates of trust or beneficial interest, or other securities
or evidences of indebtedness or interest) is exchanged solely for property of a like kind to
be held either for productive use in trade or business or for investment.
(b) Gainfrom exchanges not solely in kind.-If an exchange would be within the
provisions of subsection (a), of section 1035(a), of section 1036(a), or of section 1037(a),
if it were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only of
property permitted by such provisions to be received without the recognition of gain, but
also of other property or money, then the gain, if any, to the recipient shall be recognized, but in an amount not in excess of the sum of such money and the fair market
value of such other property.
(c) Loss from exchanges not solely in kind.-If an exchange would be within the
provisions of subsection (a), of section 1035(a), of section 1036(a), or of section 1037(a),
if it were not for the fact that the property received in exchange consists not only of
property permitted by such provisions to be received without the recognition of gain or
loss, but also of other property or money, then no loss from the exchange shall be recognized.
Id I.R.C. § 103 1(d) deals with the determination of adjusted bases in properties exchanged, while
I.R.C. § 103 1(e) discusses exchanges of livestock of different sexes not held to constitute like-kind
property. Accordingly, they are not pertinent to this note's discussion of I.R.C. § 1031.
2. United States v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1962).
3. I.R.C. § 1001(c). This section authorizes recognition of gains or losses resulting from
sales or exchanges. Specifically, the section states that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this
subtitle, on the sale or exchange of property the entire amount of the gain or loss, determined by
section 1001, shall be recognized." I.R.C. § 1002 contained a similar provision dealing with recognition of gain but was repealed for the taxable years beginning after 1976.
4. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
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is considered the equivalent of cash for income tax purposes.' The taxpayer receiving such property is generally required to report the gain
realized on the transaction. 6 Section 1031 was enacted to guard against
the possible inequity which might result from the exchange7 if it were
afforded taxable treatment under section 1001(c). 8 Specifically, a taxpayer may technically realize a gain or loss although his net assets remain unchanged. 9 Without the exception provided by section 1031, the
taxpayer would be compelled to recognize a paper gain associated with
property which, since merely exchanged, represents only a continuation
of the initial investment.' 0 The effect of nonrecognition treatment is to
provide a tax shelter in instances where the taxpayer defers recognition
of gain.
Under the protective shelter of section 103111 many taxpayers have
attempted to defer recognition of gain under the guise of a continuing
investment.12 The courts, awaredof this stratagem, have been reluctant
to defer recognition treatment in situations which fail to precisely fit the
statutory language.' 3 Section 1031's status as an exception to the general rule precipitates its strict construction. 14 Section 1031 is subject to
5. The fair market value often determines the adjusted basis of the property which, i¢hen

subtracting the original basis therefrom, establishes the amount of recognized gain or loss.
6. I.R.C. § 1001(c). This section authorizes recognition of gains or losses resulting from
sales or exchanges.
7. Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959) discusses the legislative
history of Int. Rev. Code of 1939, ch. 736, § 112(b)(5), 68A Stat. 302 (now I.R.C. § 1031).
It is the purpose of Section 112(b)(5) to save the taxpayer from an immediate recognition
of a gain, or to intermit the claim of a loss, in certain transactions where gain or loss may
have accrued in a constitutional sense, but where in a popular and economic sense there
has been a mere change in the form of ownership and the taxpayer has not really 'cashed
in' on the theoretical gain, or closed out a losing venture.
Id at 546. See also Fairfield S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 321, 323 (2d Cir. 1946).
8. See note 3 supra.
9. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
10. Id
11. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.
12. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
13. Cf. Smith v. Commissioner, 537 F.2d 972 (8th Cir. 1976) (the taxpayer attempted to avoid
recognition treatment by structuring his transfer to meet the I.R.C. § 1031 requirements. Upon
close scrutiny, the court revealed a sale disguised as an exchange and precluded nonrecognition
treatment).
14. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1960) Strict Constructionof Exceptions From General Rule:
The exceptions from the general rule requiring the recognition of all gains and losses,
like other exceptions from a rule of taxation of general and uniform application, are
strictly construed and do not extend either beyond the words or the underlying assumptions and purposes of the exception. Nonrecognition is accorded by the Code only if the
exchange is one which satisfies both (1) the specific description in the Code of an excepted exchange, and (2) the underlying purpose for which such exchange is excepted
from the general rule.
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the interpretation in Treasury Regulation section 1.1002-1(b). 5 This
regulation states that "[n]onrecognition is accorded by the Code only if
the exchange is one which satisfies both (1) the specific description in
the Code of an excepted exchange, and (2) the underlying purpose for
which such exchange is excepted from the general rule."' 6 This two
tier analysis is typically applied to the facts of each case interpreting
section 1031.
Analysis of cases interpreting section 1031 reveals several notable
factors that courts consider in determining whether to delay recognition

of gain.' 7 Among these factors are the following: (1) whether the substance of the transfer meets the express congressional purpose;'" (2)
whether the nature of the transfer involves an exchange of like-kind
property; 19 and (3) whether the element of simultaneity has been satisfied."° While all of these factors remain significant, the predominant
factor in recent opinions relates to the question whether the substance
of the exchange meets the express congressional purpose of section
103 1.21 Bruce Starker v. United States2 2 and TJ Starker v. United
Id Although I.R.C. § 1002 has been repealed and incorporated into I.R.C. § 1001(c), Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1002-1(b) remains in effect and interprets I.R.C. § 1001(c).
15. Id
16. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b) (1960).
17. This paper, in discussing the exchange and like-kind property concepts, in addition to the
legislative purpose of I.R.C. § 1031, relies primarily on the following case law from which the
significance of these factors becomes apparent. See Commissioner v. Brown, 380 U.S. 563 (1965);
Commissioner v. Court Holding Co., 324 U.S. 331 (1945); Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465
(1935); Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Weisbart & Co. v. First Nat'l Bank
of Dalhart, 568 F.2d 391 (5th Cir. 1976); Leslie Co. v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1976);
Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968); Carlton v. United States, 385
F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1963); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963);
United States v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1962); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269
F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959); Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner, 192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951);
Fairfield S.S. Corp. v. Commissioner, 157 F.2d 321 (2d Cir. 1946); Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v.
Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir. 1945); Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st
Cir. 1940); Starker v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 864 (D. Or. 1977); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69
T.C. 905 (1978); 124 Front Street, Inc., 65 T.C. 6(A) (1975); Coupe v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394
(1969); Leo A. Woodbury, 49 T.C. 180 (1967); Rogers, 44 T.C. 126 (1965); J.H. Baird Publishing
Co., 39 T.C. 608 (1962); Mercantile Trust Co. of Balt. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935);
Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S. Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or.
1975); Juhl Smith, 75-153 T.C.M. (P-H) (1975). See note 196 infra and accompanying text for a
list of cases interpreting I.R.S. § 1031 by other circuit courts of appeal as well as by the U.S. Tax
Court.
18. See notes 53-77 infra and accompanying text.
19. See notes 85-97 infra and accompanying text.
20. See notes 103-13 infra and accompanying text.
21. See notes 53-84, 161-66 infra and accompanying text. See Starker v. United States, 602
F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Starker v.
United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
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States23 evidence the courts' willingness to broadly construe the section
1031 exception 2 4 by affording nonrecognition treatment to transfers
which fall within the provision's underlying purpose. 25 This represents
a significant departure from the era of strict construction in which close
adherence to the express or implied dictate of section 1031 was re26
quired.
This note analyzes the Starker cases' 27 interpretation of nonrecognition treatment under I.R.C. section 1031 and focuses on their reappraisal of the factors used to interpret section 1031. Although
traditional factors are not discarded, Starker I and Starker II emphasize new priorities.2 8 The Starker opinions suggest that strict interpretation of section 1031 is of diminished value when compared with the
more inclusive treatment of transfers envisaged by the Starker cases.
Their elevation of substance over form has, with respect to certain
transactions, generated enthusiasm among practitioners seeking to
maximize tax deferment opportunities.
II.
A.

ST4RER I

AND ST4PER II: THE FACTS AND ISSUES

Examining Starker I

In Starker1,29 taxpayers received nonrecognition treatment under
section 1031 in transactions where they relinquished title and control of
their property in exchange for a promise, from their corporate transferees, to convey like-kind property in the future.3 0 The Starkers entered
into two similar agreements, one with the Longview Fibre Company
and the other with the Crown Zellerbach Corporation. In both transactions real estate exchange agreements were executed 3 1 in which the
Starkers agreed to convey particular realty to those companies in return
22. 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975) [hereinafter
referred to as Starker 1].
23. 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter referred to as Starker I1].
24. I.R.C. § 1031.
25. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
26. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
27. Any plural references to the Starker cases refer both to Starker I and Starker 11.
28. See notes 143-92 infra and accompanying text.
29. Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 1 8443
(D. Or. 1975).
30. Id
31. These agreements evidenced the taxpayers' intent to exchange realty, as well as the value
of such realty.
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for a credit in the amount of the value of the realty transferred.32 The
Starkers did not control the cash used by the companies to purchase the
like-kind properties selected by the Starkers in exchange for their land.
In addition, the Starkers did not have the right under the contract to
demand cash in lieu of property.3 3 The contract did state, however,
that both parties must agree in writing to the value of the properties
conveyed 34 before the agreement could be credited accordingly. Nevertheless, the agreement stated that if a credit balance remained after a
five year period, the companies would pay the Starkers in cash. Ultimately, both companies transferred parcels of realty to the Starkers reducing the exchange value credit to zero, so that realty, not cash,
exchanged hands.
The Starkers' claim that nonrecognition treatment should be afforded under I.R.C. section 1031 was rejected by the Internal Revenue
Service.3 5 Accordingly, the question presented was whether a promise
to convey property in the future in exchange for a present transfer of
realty satisfied the like-kind property requirement prescribed by section
1031.36 The Internal Revenue Service argued that a promise in exchange for realty did not satisfy the like-kind requirement. The
Starkers contended, however, that the promise was merely an intermediate step resulting in an exchange of like-kind property. The court
adopted the taxpayers' position and accorded section 1031 status to the
transaction.3 7
B.

Examining Starker II
Starker 1138 presents factual patterns and legal issues similar to

32. Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 1 8443
(D. Or. 1975).
33. id at 1551.

34. Id
35. Although the Starker I opinion does not discuss the reasons why the I.R.S. opposed
I.R.C. § 1031 treatment, presumably the I.R.S. found the like-kind property requirement lacking.
In the opinion of the I.R.S., the Starkers' transfer of realty, in exchange for a promise to convey
realty in the future, was changing the nature of the property from realty to personalty, precluding
I.R.C. § 1031's application. Additionally, the I.R.S. claimed that I.R.C. § 1031's operation was
precluded because of the possibility that the Starkers may have received cash in exchange for their
realty, in noncompliance with the like-kind property requirement of I.R.C. § 103 1(a).
36. Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443
(D. Or. 1975).
37. Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) T 8443
(D. Or. 1975). At 75-1551 the court states that the taxpayers "exchanged those properties solely
foriproperties of like-kind to be held by them either for productive use in their trade or business or
for investment within the meaning of Section 103 1(a) of the Internal Revenue Code." Id
38. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
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Starker .39 In 1967, T.J. Starker and the Crown Zellerbach Corporation entered into a land exchange agreement. 40 The agreement directed
Starker to convey his timberland to Crown. As consideration, Crown
agreed to acquire and deed4 ' other realty to Starker within five years
or, in the alternative, to pay him the value of his timberland. 42 Approximately two months later,4 3 Starker conveyed his timberland to
Crown. In recognition of Starker's performance Crown then entered
into its records an exchange value credit of $1,502,500. 4
At Starker's direction Crown subsequently conveyed parcels of realty over the next two year period, representing Crown's compliance
with the exchange agreement.4 5 Crown purchased the majority of these
parcels from third parties and conveyed them directly to Starker. 6 In
one instance, however, Crown secured a third party purchaser's right to
a realty parcel and reassigned that right to Starker. As in StarkerI, the
exchange value credit was reduced to zero by virtue of the land transfers and no money exchanged hands.
Starker claimed nonrecognition treatment under section 1031 in
his 1967 income tax return. Although he reported no gain on the transactions, his bases in the properties relinquished were less than the market value of the properties received. 47 Accordingly, the Internal
Revenue Service claimed that section 1031 was inapplicable and assessed the appropriate deficiency.4 8
On appeal the Ninth Circuit held that Starker's transfer of timberland in exchange for Crown's promise and subsequent performance
constituted a like-kind exchange that was entitled to nonrecognition
treatment under section 103 1.4 9 This determination rested on the conclusion that the substance of the exchange fit squarely within section
1031's express congressional purpose.50 The court's willingness to ex39. 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH)
8443 (D. Or. 1975). Both
Starker cases involved members of the same family entering into exchange agreements with the
Crown Zellerbach Corporation.
40. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1342 (9th Cir. 1979). This agreement was en-

tered into on April 1, 1967.
41. Id at 1343.
42. Id
43. This transfer occurred on May 31, 1967.
44. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1979).
45. Id Crown transferred a total of twelve parcels of realty to Starker.
46. 602 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1979).
47. Id at 1343.
48. Id
49. Id
50. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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amine the substance of the transaction in the context of the statute's
expressed congressional purpose-" signalled the beginning of a new era
of nonrecognition treatment under section 1031.52
III.

I.R.C.

SECTION

1031:

To
A.

NONRECOGNITION TREATMENT PRIOR

ST.4KER I AND

II

The Determinative Feature: Does the Substance of the Transaction
Meet the CongressionalPurpose?

Since the application of section 1031 is mandatory,5 3 it is necessary
to critically examine the facts of a given exchange when determining
54
whether a particular transaction falls within the ambit of that section.
In recent cases, the actual result has been determinative.5 The courts
have emphasized that an examination of the substance of a transaction, 56 as opposed to its form, is crucial in determining whether it complies with the statutory purpose.5 7 The language of section 1031(a)

from property
mandates nonrecognition treatment for gains resulting
58
"exchanged solely for property of a like kind."

section

1001(c), 5 9

As an exception to

section 1031 is subject to the narrow interpretation

enunciated in Treasury Regulation 1.1002-1(b). 6 ° This regulation confers nonrecognition treatment on transactions meeting the congres1031,61 as well as those precisely
sional purpose underlying section
62
fitting its statutory language.
Analysis of the legislative history of section 1031 reveals concern
with recognizing an intermittent gain or loss for a continuing and unrealized investment. 63 Stressing fundamental fairness, Congress de51. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
52. I.R.C. § 1031.
53. United States v. Vardine, 305 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1962).
54. I.R.C. § 1031; Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(a)-i (1967).
55. E.g., Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Alderson v. Commissioner,
317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1
U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
56. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465, 469 (1935). Gregory first recognized the axiom that
substance should supercede form. This principle has become a fundamental rule in the law of
taxation.
57. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
58. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
59. I.R.C. §§ 1031-1040 set forth common nontaxable exchanges.
60. Treas. Reg. § 1.1002-1(b); see note 14 supra.
61. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
62. I.R.C. § 1031.
63. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess., (1934) 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 554, 564. See note 7
supra and accompanying text.
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cided to defer recognition until the taxpayer closed out his original
investment."

Another indicator of congressional purpose is the statutory language itself.65 Section 1031(a) states that it is applicable to property
"exchanged solely for property of a like kind. 6 6 Clearly, nonrecognition treatment applies only to exchanges and not to sales of like-kind
property. 67 To qualify as an exchange, the transaction must be a recip-

rocal transfer of property68 and not a transfer of property solely for
monetary consideration. 69 Identifying whether the transaction is a

sale70 or an exchange can be determinative in ascertaining the applica72
bility of section 1031.71 A sale is the receipt of cash for realty,
whereas an exchange is a transfer of property between owners.7 To
constitute an exchange the transfer must be a single transaction 74 and
the properties involved must be similar in value and nature.'- The
'76 If
property must be "exchanged solely for property of a like kind.
like-kind realty is the only subject of the exchange then section 1031
will apply to the entire transaction."
One reason for the distinction between a sale and an exchange 78 is
administrative convenience. 79 By enacting section 1031 it was hoped
that the administrative difficulty involved in assessing the value of
64. Id
65. P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING 19 (1975).

66. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
67. See notes 78-84 infra and accompanying text.
68. "The very essence of an exchange is the transfer of property between owners, while

the mark of a sale is the receipt of cash for the property." Carlton v. United States, 385
F.2d 238, 242 (5th Cir. 1967).
E.g., Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Coastal Terminal, Inc. v. United
States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963). See generally 3 MERTENS, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION

§ 20.28 (1967).
69. Id
70. See notes 78-84 infra and accompanying text.
71. I.R.C. § 1031(a) expressly requires an exchange of like-kind property to qualify for nonrecognition treatment. See generally notes 78-84 infra and accompanying text.
72. See note 68 supra and accompanying text.
73. Id
74. Neither I.R.C. § 1031 nor Treas. Reg. § 1.1031 expressly state that simultaneity is necessary to effect § 1031 treatment. The I.R.S. has agreed, however, that the concept of simultaneity is
embodied within the term exchange. See e.g., Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652,
655 (5th Cir. 1968); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
75. See note 1 supra and accompanying text.

76. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
77. Id
78. See notes 67-75 supra and accompanying text.
79. E.g., Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1356 (9th Cir. 1979); H.R. REP. No. 704,
73rd Cong., 2d Sess., (1934) 1939-1 (Pt. 2) C.B. 554, 564.
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property exchanged could be avoided."0 No valuation problem exists if
a sale occurs, because the parties can then easily ascertain the values of
the properties and a resulting gain or loss is readily determinable.8 ' In
an exchange, however, section 1031 applies because the taxpayer's economic position is the same after the transaction as it was before the
transaction. 2
The problem with many transfers is that frequently an exchange of
parcels of equivalent values is difficult to obtain. Consequently, the
possibility of a cash supplement enters the negotiations. While "[a]n
exchange is not vitiated because cash is received in addition to property,"8 3 failure to qualify for section 1031 treatment typically occurs
when cash or its equivalent becomes the sole consideration for the
84
transfer.
B.

The Like-Kind Property Requirement
1. Does the possibility of receiving cash preclude the application
of section 1031?

The fundamental purpose of section 1031 is to defer recognition
treatment on a continuing investment.8 5 To ensure compliance with
this purpose an exchange of like-kind property is required. 6 It is crucial to identify the purpose of a cash supplement in an exchange to
determine whether cash is exchanged as part of the transaction 7 or
whether it is received in lieu of realty. 8 In the former situation, when
cash is received along with the transferred realty to equalize the value
of the exchanged lands, the qualifying property will receive nonrecognition treatment.8 9 The cash received will be recognized separately
under I.R.C. section 1001(c). 9" In the latter instance, however, where
the receipt of cash in lieu of an exchange of like-kind property occurs,
80. See note 81 infra and accompanying text.
81. See generally notes 78-80 supra and notes 82-84 infra and accompanying text.
82. Juhl Smith, T 75-153 T.C.M. (P-H) (1975).
83. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 792 (9th Cir. 1963).
84. Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238, 240-43 (5th Cir. 1967).
85. See note 7 supra, note 93 infra and accompanying text.
86. In order to continue the original investment, the taxpayer must exchange his property for
property of a like-kind. I.R.C. § 103 1(a). If the character of the property were changed during the
course of the transfer the taxpayer would be initiating a new investment, rather than continuing
his former investment.
87. See notes 88-91 infra and accompanying text.
88. See note 91 infra and accompanying text.
89. See note 90 infra and accompanying text.
90. See note 6 supra and accompanying text.
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section 1031 does not apply and gain or loss is recognized. 91

A separate problem arises when taxpayers contemplate the possibility92 of receiving cash strictly in lieu of realty, but actually exchange
properties, either in a straight property transfer or a property-cash supplement transfer. The application of section 1031 to this situation re-

mains a difficult issue, one predicated on whether the possibility of
receiving cash defeats the purpose of the section. 93 The Internal Reve-

nue Service had previously demanded recognition of gain or loss where
the possibility of receiving cash in lieu of property existed. The agency
relied on a strict interpretation of section 1031 and argued that this cash

possibility provision excluded nonrecognition treatment.94 Consistent
application of section 1031 prohibited its use in situations where receipt
of cash by the taxpayer was a possibility.95 Recently though, courts
have rejected this position and have resolved the issue of the section's

applicability on the basis of actual results. 96 If the possibility of a strict
cash exchange is proffered by the taxpayers, but like-kind property is

ultimately exchanged, courts will examine other elements of the transaction to determine the applicability of section 1031. 97
2.

The Control Factor Examined as a Last Resort

When courts are faced with the difficulty of determining the nature
of a transfer, 9 they sometimes calculate the degree of control the tax91. See note 86 supra and accompanying text. Receipt of cash for the property clearly
changes its character because it terminates the taxpayer's original investment and indicates a sale.
Any of these conditions preclude operation of I.R.C. § 1031 and gain or loss is recognized under
I.R.C. § 1001(c).
92. Id In these marginal instances some courts (e.g., Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238
(5th Cir. 1967); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963)) have examined evidence
of the taxpayer's intent when determining whether to apply I.R.C. § 1031 to the transaction.
While the importance of intent has declined substantially in recent decisions (e.g., Starker v.
United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H),
75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975)), the taxpayer's contemplation of receiving cash in
lieu of realty could arguably preclude I.R.C. § 103 I's operation.
93. See notes 7, 70-71, 75-77 supra and accompanying text. If the possibility of receiving
cash is merely to supplement the exchange, serving to equalize the values of the properties involved, a strong argument favoring I.R.C. § 1031 is likely. Conversely, if the cash possibility indicates tax avoidance or a sale, disguised as an exchange of like-kind property, the purpose of
§ 1031 is defeated and consequently inapplicable.
94. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 92 supra.
96. E.g., Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Alderson v. Commissioner,
317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1
U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
97. Because this cash possibility concept is a problem area, courts have examined other factors in determining I.R.C. § 1031's applicability. See notes 17-20 supra and accompanying text.
98. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
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payer possesses over the property that he will ultimately receive.99 If
the taxpayer has the right to demand cash in lieu of receiving realty, the
exchange may not qualify for section 1031 treatment.'l° Conversely, if
the other party has the burden of locating suitable property and will
make every attempt to convey suitable realty before transferring cash,
courts are more likely to grant nonrecognition treatment to the exchange.101 Within these parameters, case law gives the practitioner
minimal guidance in predicting section 1031 treatment.' 02
C.

The Princioleof Simultaneity. An Extraneous Requirement?

The last requirement for invoking section 1031 is simultaneity. 3
Under a literal interpretation of section 1031, an exchange of property
occurs only if each taxpayer owns his respective parcel of land and
relinquishes its control at the same time, resulting in a reciprocal, simultaneous exchange of like-kind property."° This exchange requirement was relaxed significantly to allow parties without title to desirable
realty to acquire it "for the sole purpose of such exchange."' 0 5 If the
transfers are framed as an exchange and run through the same escrow,
section 1031 treatment generally applies. Exchanges must be effected
by the parties but some courts permit exchanges to be conducted
through 06disinterested third parties, agents of the parties, or escrow accounts. 1
99. See notes 100-02 infra and accompanying text.
100. Presumably, the courts are reluctant to grant § 1031 treatment to a transaction in which
the taxpayer has unlimited control. The control factor refers to which party determines whether
the transaction is an exchange or a sale. See Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652,
655 (5th Cir. 1968); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); 124 Front Street,
Inc., 65 T.C. 6(A) (1975).
101. Frequently, if the other party to the transfer, (not the party claiming nonrecognition
treatment under I.R.C. § 1031), has the obligation to locate the property, the party claiming nonrecognition treatment has less control over the result and increased credibility in the court's view.
See note 102 infra and accompanying text.
102. See note 17 supra.
103. Simultaneity refers to the timing of the exchange. Simultaneous is defined as "a word of
comparison meaning that two or more occurrences or happenings are identical in time." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1241 (5th ed. 1979). WesT, 39 WORDS AND PHRASES 431 (perm. ed. 1953)
states that "[t]he word 'simultaneous' is a word of comparison meaning that two or more occurrences or happenings are identical in time." Id.
104. See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1344-45, 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1979). Unlike
the timing factor denoted by simultaneity, reciprocity refers to the obligatory factor, connoting
mutuality. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1141 (5th ed. 1979) defines reciprocal as "given or owed
mutually as between two persons; interchanged. Reciprocal obligations are those due from one
person to another and vice versa."
105. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1963).
106. While running both transfers through the same escrow account is not necessarily indica-
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Section 1031 was enacted to facilitate the Internal Revenue Serv-

ice's task of assessing the recognition of gain or loss. The section
postpones assessment until a sale occurs, thereby allowing the sale price
to fix the value of the properties involved.10 7 If a simultaneous exchange occurs, the Internal Revenue Service can better scrutinize the
transaction and insure taxation of gain at a future time when the prop-

erty is sold.'

The Internal Revenue Service has insisted that the term

exchange embody the concept of a simultaneous occurrence.' 0 9 In re-

cent years taxpayers have argued that a reciprocal exchange is sufficient
for qualification under section 1031.'10 Simultaneous transfers are difficult to accomplish and courts have recently recognized that where re-

ciprocal exchanges'

are in accordance with the congressional purpose

of section 103 1,112 nonrecognition treatment should not be denied

merely because simultaneity is lacking." 3

The recent trend has been to broadly construe section 1031.114 After all relevant factors are considered," 5 the most important one appears to be whether the substance of the transaction falls within the
congressional purpose of section 103 1.116 Courts seem willing to extend

nonrecognition treatment to reciprocal exchanges of property" 17 where
is continuing, rather than closing out, his original investthe taxpayer
8
I
ment."

tive of literal simultaneity, the court allowed the use of the same escrow by all parties involved to
impute simultaneity in law. See note 188 infra and accompanying text.
Exchanges must be effected by the parties, but some courts permit these exchanges to be
conducted through disinterested third parties. In Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975-2 C.B. 332 exchange
treatment was afforded to a three-party transaction including improvements.
Attorneys frequently act as their clients' agents in these types of transactions. E.g., Coupe v.
Commissioner, 52 T.C. 394 (1969). See generally Rogers, 44 T.C. 126; Juhl Smith, 1 75-153
T.C.M. (P-H) (1975).
107. See note 81 supra and accompanying text.
108. Id
109. See note 103 supra and accompanying text. See also Alderson v. Commissioner, 317
F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
110. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
Ill. Id
112. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
113. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
114. Id at 1342.
115. See notes 18-20 supra and accompanying text.
116. See notes 18, 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
117. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979).
118. Id See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
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D. Legal Foundations: A Case in Point
Alderson v. Commissioner 19 provides an excellent predicate from
which to analyze the Starker courts' subsequent reasoning and decisions.120 Upon examining the facts and issues in Alderson the modification of section 1031 by the Starker cases becomes readily apparent.
In Alderson, 12' the taxpayer transferred property to the Alloy Die
Casting Company 2 2 by drafting an escrow agreement constituting a
purchase and sale in which the taxpayer agreed to sell his property to
Alloy for $172,871.40. 123 At a later date the taxpayer, Alderson, selected realty 2 4 which he desired to obtain in exchange for the property' 25 he had already transferred to Alloy.' 26 He ultimately received
this property in payment of Alloy's $192,891.40 liability.12 7 The issue
was whether the transaction constituted a sale, the gain from which was
recognizable under section 1002,128 or whether it constituted a nontaxthe meaning of Section 1031129 of the Internal
able exchange within
30
Revenue Code.'
The government contended that the original agreement between
Alderson and Alloy was a sale of land rather than an exchange.' 3 1 The
taxpayers contended, however, that the amendment of the escrow
agreement to effectuate a transfer of like-kind realty between the taxpayer and Alloy was in32fact an exchange and should be afforded nonrecognition treatment.'
The court adopted the taxpayer's reasoning and afforded nonrecognition treatment. 33 While the exchange was not within the exact let119. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
120. See notes 22 & 23 supra and accompanying text.
121. See note 119 supra.
122. Alloy was the corporate transferee inAlderson and was in a position analogous to Crown
and Longview Fibre in the Starker cases.
123. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 1963).
124. Id The realty selected by Alderson was the Salinas property located in Monterey

County, California.
125. See note 123 supra and accompanying text.
126. Alderson transferred the Buena Park property to Alloy on May 21, 1957.
127. See note 123 supra and accompanying text. Alderson and Alloy agreed upon the value of
the Buena Park realty and set Alloy's liability after receiving this property at $192,891.40.
128. I.R.C. § 1002. This section authorized recognition of gains or losses resulting from sales
or exchanges. I.R.C. § 1001(c) currently addresses recognition of gain replacing I.R.C. § 1002.
129. I.R.C. § 1031 affords nonrecognition treatment.
130. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
131. Id at 792-93.
132. Id at 793-94.

133. Id at 795.
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ter of section 103 1,134 the court found no hint of fraud or camouflage in
the transaction and looked beyond the form to the substance of the
transfer. In doing so, it relied on Mercantile Trust Co. v.Commissioner'3 5 and held that "[t]he property was, in fact, exchanged. That
fact is controlling here."'136 Focusing on the actual result, the exchange,
Alderson established the principle that in section 1031 cases, absent any
hint of fraud, the court looks to actual occurrences, not recitations of
37
intent. 1
Prior to Alderson the model section 1031 transaction would have
included the parties' draft of an exchange agreement at the deal's inception, 138 ascertaining the value of the properties involved, 139 in order
to determine the fairness of the transfer and the true nature of the
transaction."1 But Alderson extended nonrecognition treatment to the
Alloy transaction despite the taxpayer's statement of intent.' 4' The
court allowed the amended escrow agreement to satisfy the intent factor, since the Aldersons' ultimate intent and performance complied
with the exchange requirement under section 1031.142

IV.

THE TAXPAYERS' TRIUMPH: THE STARKER

CASES

The Starker opinions are important from a practical standpoint
because they give the taxpayer greater latitude in effecting nonrecognized property transfers and delayed tax consequences.143 By elevating
to a determinative status the question whether the substance of the
transfer complies with section 1031's congressional purpose, the
Starker courts have given the practitioner a new method to defer tax
benefits when planning corporate reorganization and transfers.144 The
Starker I opinion 145 disposes of the government's argument 146 by em134. See note I supra and accompanying text.
135. 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
136. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 795 (9th Cir. 1963).
137. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
138. Id Alderson allowed an amended agreement to qualify for nonrecognition treatment.
139. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). This valuation process facilitates the use of an escrow account and determines the necessity of a cash supplement in implementing the exchange.
140. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
141. See 317 F.2d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 1963). The factual pattern demonstrates the taxpayer's
intent throughout the course of the negotiations as well as the transaction.
142. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 791, 795 (9th Cir. 1963).
143. See note 27 supra and accompanying text. Because of the similarity between Starker I
and Starker II plural references to both are frequently employed throughout this article.
144. See note 7 supra.
145. 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
146. Id
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phasizing the statutory purpose of deferring recognition of intermittent
gain on a continuation of an existing investment. 47 Although Starker
I's position seems evident, Starker II expressly addresses each factor
and reconciles the confficting arguments. 4 The Starker courts specifically addressed three issues involved in interpreting
section 1031149 and
50
resolved all of them in the taxpayer's favor.'
The principal impact of the Starker cases is their advancement of
the policy and congressional purpose requirements as conditions precedent to nonrecognition treatment.' 5 ' The effect of this modification is
to make it easier for the taxpayer to invoke section 1031 nonrecognition
treatment.- 2 The Starker opinions also modify traditional constructions of the like-kind property requirement' 5 3 and allow receipt of
something less than realty to comply with section 1031 requisites.15 4 In
perhaps the most liberal application of the like-kind property requirement to date, the Starker cases held that section 1031 was satisfied
where a promise to convey parcels in the future was exchanged for a
present realty conveyance. This exchange was held to satisfy the likekind requirement of I.R.C. section 103 1.15 In addition, both opinions
held that the unrealized possibility of a cash sale did not vitiate nonrecognition treatment. 5 6 Finally, the Starker courts 57 extended their interpretation of the simultaneity concept to encompass reciprocal
transfers- 8 for purposes of section 1031 treatment. 5 9 Without discarding the simultaneity principle, the acceptance by Starker I and II of
mere reciprocity presents the greatest departure to date from the princi147. See note 7 supra and accompanying text.
148. The Starker I opinion expressly relies upon the StarkerI holding and fully addresses
the rationale thereof. See 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979). As demonstrated by the brevity of the
Starker! opinion, the court offers little explanation of the rationale underlying its holding. Upon
close scrutiny, however, the rationale behind its bold ruling is evident.
149. See notes 18-20 supra, notes 161-92 infra and accompanying text.
150. Id.
151. See note 147 supra and accompanying text.
152. Id
153. 602 F.2d 1341, 1347, 1355 (9th Cir. 1979); 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas.
(CCH) $ 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
154. 602 F.2d 1341, 1355 (9th Cir. 1979); 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas.

(CCH)
155.
156.
AFTR
157.
158.
(CCH)
f 159.

8443 (D. Or. 1975).
See note 154 supra.
Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1354 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States, 35
2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
See note 27 supra.
602 F.2d 1341, 1347 (9th Cir. 1979); 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas.
8443 (D. Or. 1975).
Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1353 (9th Cir. 1979).
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ple of simultaneity.1 60
A.

Substance Meeting CongressionalPurpose: A New Condition
Precedent

The paramount feature of the Starker cases is their adoption of the
policy and congressional purpose approach. By elevating this requirement to a condition precedent to nonrecognition treatment the Starker
cases have established a new keystone for section 1031 analysis.
The alternative method of testing section 103 1's applicability is to
examine the taxpayer's intent at the commencement of the transaction
to see if the transaction falls within the letter of section 1031.161 While
intent was important in those earlier cases which involved the possible
receipt of cash 162 and which utilized a mechanical test, its significance
has recently waned. 63 In Starker I the court summarized recent decisions by emphasizing the actual transaction over the parties initial declarations of intent."6 Intent has not been discarded entirely, but its
importance has been substantially diminished as compared to the actual transaction. 65 Upon these bases the Starker courts clearly rejected the government's contention which had precluded section 1031
treatment for transfers involving the possibility of a cash exchange in
66
lieu of receiving realty.1
B.

The Like-Kind PropertyRequirement

Section 1031 requires that the character of property exchanged be
property of a like-kind. 67 Disregarding form and stressing substance, 168 the Starker cases broke new ground by according section
1031 treatment to an exchange of realty for personalty. Starker I allowed a mere promise to convey like-kind property in the future to
160. See note 158 supra.
161. Generally this is done by examining the written agreement between the parties at the

transaction's inception. Eg., Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1979);
Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 1963); Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR
2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
162. See Carlton v. United States, 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967).
163. See Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1979); Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790, 793-94 (9th Cir. 1963).
164. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1355 (9th Cir. 1979).
165. Id at 1353-54.
166. Id
167. I.R.C. § 1031(a).
168. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
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qualify for nonrecognition treatment. 69 StarkerII found that a third
party purchaser's right to acquire specific realty satisfied the like-kind
property requirement. 70 The Internal Revenue Service applied the
technical formula for like-kind property and declared that section 1031
was inapplicable. 7 ' The taxpayers responded by urging a rejection of
the government's realty-personalty distinction.' 72 They argued that the
court should look past the form to the substance of the transaction,
which would ultimately result in an exchange of real
property. 73 The
74
rationale.
Starker courts accepted the taxpayers'
1. The Possibility of a Cash Exchange
Under the like-kind property requirement of section 1031, a problem is presented because of the possibility of receiving cash in lieu of
realty.' 75 Although actual receipt of cash in exchange for realty precludes 1031 treatment, where the possibility is envisaged as an exchange alternative, the issue of whether the like-kind176property
requirement is satisfied has not been conclusively resolved.
The Starker courts confronted this issue because of the possibility
that the taxpayers might receive cash instead of property. 77 In both of
7
the Starker cases the taxpayers preferred the receipt of realty to cash.1
They anticipated difficulty in locating suitable realty and included a
cash exchange clause in their agreements. 79 The exchange agreement
provided that the Starkers would have no right to demand cash instead
of property in exchange for the realty they transferred to the companies.'8 0 In addition, the taxpayers had no control over the companies'
respective purchases of land, with the express exception that the land
purchased would have to be suitable to the Starkers.' 8 ' Since the issue
169. See note 22 supra and accompanying text.
170. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1355 (9th Cir. 1979).
171. Id
172. Id
173. Id
174. Id. See note 56 supra and accompanying text.
175. See notes 85-97 supra and accompanying text.
176. See notes 92-95 supra and accompanying text.
177. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1343 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States, 35
AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
178. Id
179. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1342-43 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States,
35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H) 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
180. See note 177 supra.

181. Starker v. United States, 35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H) 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH)
(D. Or. 1975).
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of acceptability was not addressed in the opinion it was probably perceived as an insignificant issue. 18 2 The Internal Revenue Service argued that the taxpayers' investment would terminate upon receipt of
cash and therefore this possibility should preclude nonrecognition
treatment. 183 The taxpayers countered by claiming that since taxable
treatment is applied retrospectively, the determination should be made
in light of the actual result." 4 The Starker courts, relying on Alderson,185 agreed with the taxpayers and held that the final result controlled.'8 6 If the mere possibility of receiving cash instead of property
never materialized and the property exchange resulted in a continuation of the taxpayers' original investment, section 1031 treatment was
187
not precluded.
C. Has the Simultaneity Requirement Become Unreasonable?
Under a literal interpretation of section 1031 a simultaneous exchange of like-kind property will precipitate nonrecognition treatment.
In Alderson the simultneity requirement was relaxed to include exchanges resulting from the use of the same escrow account, thereby
implying simultaneity in law.' 8 8 Although Starker I did not expressly
reject the principle of simultaneity it did imply that simultaneity was an
artificial condition that could be overlooked if the transaction was indeed a reciprocal exchange.' 8 9 Starker II endorsed Starker I and held
that the two year time lapse was inconsequential' 9 0 for purposes of
nonrecognition treatment.' 9' In the wake of the Starker decisions it is
evident that mere reciprocity will suffice for the traditional simultaneity
requirement under section 1031.192
182. Id
183. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1353-54 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States,
35 AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 1 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
184. Id
185. See note 119 supra.
186. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1355 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States, 35
AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
187. See note I supra and accompanying text.
188. 317 F.2d 790, 791 (9th Cir. 1963).
189. Id
190. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1348 (9th Cir. 1979).
191. Id
192. Id at 1344-45.
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V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE TAXPAYERS' VICTORY
IN THE ST4RKER CASES

The Starker courts 9 3 were confronted with the opportunity to
clarify the limits of nonrecognition treatment under section 1031.
Their choice was to either extend or confine the parameters established
in Alderson. 19 Relying on Alderson, the courts relaxed the traditional
limits of section 1031,1 95 and expanded the range of like-kind exchanges which qualified for section 1031 treatment. This interpretation
of section 1031 presents a new degree of flexibility to the taxpayer who
seeks to avoid immediate tax consequences with regard to exchanged
properties. As long as the ultimate transaction falls within the congresno hint of taxpayer fraud, nonrecognition
sional purpose and there is 196
treatment will be accorded.
The courts' interpretation was predicated on an approach which
favored policy considerations 19 7 over a mechanical application of section 1031 provisions.198 In an incisive analysis of the traditional section
1031 factors, 99 the Starker courts demonstrated their deference to congressional purpose by elevating this policy and the congressional purpose test to a condition precedent to invoking nonrecognition
treatment.2 °° StarkerII wisely encouraged courts to adopt this condition precedent, which served as the keystone of analysis under Starker
II. This struck an exceptional balance by requiring the taxpayer to
meet the condition precedent without discarding consideration of the
other traditional section 1031 factors.2"' Adopting a flexible approach
193. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States, 35
AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
194. Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963).
195. See notes 53-118 supra and accompanying text.
196. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341, 1355 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States, 35
AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975). An examination of the
following cases decided by other circuit courts of appeal and the U.S. Tax Court, interpreting
I.R.C. § 1031, follows: Leslie Co. v. Commissioner, 539 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1976); Molbreak v.
Commissioner, 509 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1975); Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Tomlinson, 399 F.2d 652
(5th Cir. 1968); Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); Jordan
Marsh Co. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 453 (2d Cir. 1959); Century Electric Co. v. Commissioner,
192 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1951); Trenton Cotton Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 147 F.2d 33 (6th Cir.
1945); Portland Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 109 F.2d 479 (1st Cir. 1940); Biggs v. Commissioner, 69
T.C. 905 (1978).
197. These policy considerations determine whether the substance of the transfer meets
§ 1031's congressional purpose.
198. See notes 14, 138-42 supra and accompanying text.
199. See note I supra and accompanying text.
200. Starker v. United States, 602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979); Starker v. United States, 35
AFTR 2d 75-1550 (P-H), 75-1 U.S.Tax.Cas. (CCH) 8443 (D. Or. 1975).
201. Id
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eliminated the necessity of needlessly balancing the traditional factors
in cases warranting nonrecognition treatment as evidenced by section
103 I's congressional purpose. The Starker courts took great liberty in
construing the facts to satisfy the strict requirements of the nonrecognition statute while avoiding its artificial obstacles. 20 2
The major problem with elevating the congressional purpose test
to a determinative status is the potential for imprecise and inconsistent
results in application. Examining the holdings from a practical perspective, many problems of proof remain. Although proof of the traditional factors remain unchanged following Starker, the necessity of
satisfying the burden of proof as to the condition precedent remains
difficult. Because of its recently elevated status, a taxpayer must prove
this factor before he is allowed to proceed in employing proof of the
other factors in substantiating his position in section 1031 cases. The
liberal construction which Starker accorded to traditional section 1031
factors20 3 intimates that the problem is one of degree rather than kind.
Specifically, the question is not whether a given transaction is one of
like-kind, or simultaneously effected, but how far these requirements
may reasonably be elasticized to encompass the given facts in a particular case.
Starker II appears to have shifted the emphasis from examining
whether the facts of the case fit the test, to whether the test can be
tailored to fit the facts. Inherent in any broad test is the problem of
defining a limitation on this latitude. This is the unresolved issue that
emerges from Starker II. In the final analysis, however, Starkers' sole
adherence to policy considerations is exceedingly preferable to the
mechanical approach advanced by the government. Although the
I.R.S. may disagree, it is certainly preferable to risk over-inclusion
under section 1031 rather than retain the presently existing under-inclusion. Recognizing the intended benefits of a section 1031 exchange,
the Starker decisions also serve to induce business expansion by encouraging a taxpayer to maximize his deferment opportunities if his
business exchange meets the condition precedent, without delaying
nonrecognition treatment merely because his exchange does not
precisely fit the language of I.R.C. section 1031. Although precision
and predictability are incidents of a mechanical approach, the court
202. See note I supra and accompanying text. The intent, like-kind property, cash possibility,

control, and simultaneity factors are obstacles that preclude taxpayers, whose exchanges constitute
continuations of their initial investments, from receiving § 1031 treatment.
203. 602 F.2d 1341, 1352-53 (9th Cir. 1979).
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accurately perceives its role as an interpreter, not a prognosticator, of
I.R.C. section 1031. Thus, Starker prudently adopts the policy approach pronounced in 103 l's congressional history and espoused by the
taxpayer. 2 4
Closer scrutiny of StarkerII suggests other underlying reasons for
its holding. Implying its dissatisfaction, the court adamantly insisted
that the government adhere to its previously asserted positions in section 1031 cases. In an apparently hostile response to the I.R.S., Starker
II searches the progeny of section 1031 case law, to bind the government to its past positions in similar cases, without allowing it the opportunity to reappraise or modify its arguments. The court's reprisal is
most evident in its disposition of the collateral estoppel and simultaneity issues.
Attempting to refute the operation of collateral estoppel in Starker
11,205 the government feebly attempts to distinguish the facts and legal
issues from those involved in Starker I. The Starker II court draws
attention to the fact that, although the government disagreed with the
Starker I decision, it voluntarily dismissed its appeal.2 °6 Consequently, the government was collaterally estopped in Starker II from
relitigating similar issues decided in Starker 1. 20 7 The court shrewdly
noted the difference between the government's vigorous stance in
Starker II, as opposed to its mere disapproving acquiescence to the
unfavorable StarkerI ruling. Appearing to berate the government, the
StarkerII opinion implied that Starker I's precedential value was not
diminished when applied to the Starker II ruling, merely because the
refund in this case was ten times the amount of money that was at stake
in Starker 1

208

In another retaliatory ruling, the Starker I1 court invoked nonrecognition treatment despite the lack of simultaneity. 209 Predicating its
ruling upon the government's position in a 1968 Fifth Circuit case, Redwing Carriers,Incorporatedv. Tomlinson,2 1 the court held that I.R.C.

section 1031 should operate despite the absence of precise simultaneity.
According nonrecognition treatment to the taxpayer's loss in Redwing,
the government persuaded the court that reciprocal exchanges occur204.
205.
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Id at 1350.
Id at 1343.
I d at 1354-55.
399 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1968).
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ring "at or about the same time"'I sufficiently qualified for nonrecognition treatment. In an attempt to distinguish Starker 11 from
Redwing, the government argued that the Starker transfers were separated by a two year time period.212 Consequently, such a blatant disregard for the simultaneity requirement should preclude section 1031
treatment. In rejecting this legitimate distinction, StarkerII held that
the Redwing holding authorized nonrecognition treatment despite the
lack of simultaneity in Starker.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The Starker cases signal an era of new liberality in the application
of section 1031 nonrecognition treatment to those exchanges which fall
within its parameters. The courts repudiated the Internal Revenue
Service's narrow, mechanical interpretation of section 1031 in favor of
a broader, policy and congressional purpose test which serves as a
threshold requirement. The component parts of the former test have
also been expanded. The notion of like-kind property may encompass
personalty instead of realty, and the mere potential of a cash exchange
does not preclude section 1031 treatment where the property is actually
exchanged. The requirement of simultaneity is perceived as not requiring an exact time exchange but rather a reciprocal exchange.
The Starker decisions represent a reprisal to the government's persistently rigid and mechanical application of section 1031. But these
decisions represent something more. They represent a signal to other
circuit courts to interpret the requirements of section 1031 in accordance with the purposes for which it was enacted, in light of common
sense and practical application. The result will be an invigorated market for business related property exchanges and fairness to the taxpayer
as well as the I.R.S.; ultimately, gain will be recognized and the government will get its due.
Ann L. Muchin
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